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Abstract 
 
A prototype Privacy Preferences software tool for citizens’ health and social care 
data was developed and evaluated with focus groups comprising a wide range of 
users. The primary purpose of the focus groups was to evaluate the acceptability 
and ease-of-use of the software tool for sharing data for direct care. Fictitious data, 
based on real scenarios, was used in the evaluations. A possible use for a future 
commercial development of the tool might be in a Health Information Exchange 
system supporting access to records held in provider systems. The outcomes of the 
evaluation were that younger adults with significant computing experience could 
understand and use the tool, but people with less computer experience and 
confidence needed support. One conclusion was that the tool is appropriate for the 
citizen/patient to explore their data and to prototype sharing preferences; however, 
the preferences should only be turned into permissions which actually control access 
to data by a care professional during a consultation. This is suggested by several 
potential problems, including: adverse effects to treatment and care; difficulties with 
authentication; and, on the part of the citizen/patient user, lack of medical 
knowledge, lack of capacity (maybe unrecognised), insufficient experience with 
computing devices, and deliberate misuse. 
 
1 Data Controllers and Processors 
 
There is a need for anyone intending to make use of a Privacy Preferences Tool 
to identify data controllers and processors. The ICO has provided the following 
information regarding this topic. 
  
Under the GDPR, one of the key challenges in the planning stages of sharing 
personal data is to identify the flow/s of the data, and at each point in the 
process determine who the controller/s and or processor/s are. This will enable 
better risk identification and mitigation and clarity of who will have responsibility 
and accountability at each stage and is likely to be unique depending upon the 
organisations and processes involved. Information about this can be found in the 
ICO’s guidance on controllers and processors: https://ico.org.uk/for-
organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-
regulation-gdpr/key-definitions/controllers-and-processors/ 
 
If those looking to use the tool involve data from several sources, they may 
need to consider a distinction between controllers working together as joint 
controllers or alone as individual controllers. Joint controllers will decide between 
them on the purpose and manner for which personal data is collected; it will not 
be decided by one single organisation. There is more detailed information on this 
at: https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-
general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/controllers-and-processors/ 
  
In terms of privacy information, data protection legislation also requires 
controllers and joint controllers to be transparent about their respective 
responsibilities ensuring that individuals know who to contact when they want to 
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exercise their information rights under the legislation. Information about the 
joint arrangements would need to be made to individuals and, irrespective of the 
joint arrangement, an individual may exercise their rights in respect of and 
against each controller. 
 
Furthermore, it is also good practice to conduct a Data Protection Impact 
Assessment (DPIA) for any major project which requires the processing of 
special category personal data likely to result in a high risk to individuals. 
A DPIA should describe the nature, scope, context and purposes of the 
processing; assess necessity, proportionality and compliance measures; identify 
and assess risks to individuals; and identify any additional measures to mitigate 
those risks. ICO guidance on this process can be found 
at: https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-
general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/accountability-and-governance/data-
protection-impact-assessments/ 
 
2 Rights regarding sharing data 
 
The GDPR requires practices to process data ‘fairly’ and in a ‘transparent manner’ 
which is ‘easily accessible and easy to understand’.  
 
Therefore the information provided to people must be concise, transparent, 
intelligible, easily accessible, and it must use clear and plain language. There is 
more detailed information on this at https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-
to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulation-
gdpr/individual-rights/right-to-be-informed/ 
 
In order to process personal data securely compliance is required with two laws: 
Common Law duty of confidentiality, and Statutory Law (GDPR, DPA 2018).  
 
Using the Privacy Preferences Tool will include the processing of special category 
data and the GDPR provides this type of data with more protection. In order to 
lawfully process special category data, you must identify both a lawful basis 
under Article 6 and a separate condition for processing special category data 
under Article 9. This is because this type of data could create significant risks to 
a person’s fundamental rights and freedoms. For example, by putting them at 
risk of unlawful discrimination. Organisations will need to show you have 
considered this when detailing the lawful basis for your processing. Further 
information on this can be found at https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-
to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/lawful-
basis-for-processing/special-category-data/. Implied consent is the mechanism 
for Common Law compliance within the Tool, although it must be noted that 
while consent for sharing may be withheld under Common Law, the basis for 
processing data under GDPR may mean that information is nonetheless 
appropriately shared between organisations and care professionals. 
 
Provision for opting out of sharing data via a Local Care Record or Health 
Information Exchange system should be available. 
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Citizens have the right to restrict the sharing of their health and social care data, 
except in certain cases where legal requirements apply such as involvement of third 
parties, notification of communicable diseases, etc. Guidance on GDPR and privacy 
notices offered by the BMA is available at: 
https://www.bma.org.uk/advice/employment/ethics/confidentiality-and-health-
records/general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/gdpr-and-practice-privacy-notices-
ppns  
 
However restricting availability may have severe consequences. In extreme 
situations, the General Medical Council Ethical Guidance for Doctors, para 31 
advises that ongoing treatment might be suspended where the patient refuses to 
share data deemed essential. 
https://www.gmc-uk.org/ethical-guidance/ethical-guidance-for-doctors/confidentiality 
 
As well as a right to restrict access to data. under the GDPR individuals also 
have the following rights regarding their information: 
  
1. The right to be informed 
2. The right of access 
3. The right to rectification 
4. The right to erasure 
5. The right to restrict processing 
6. The right to data portability 
7. The right to object 
8. Rights in relation to automated decision making and profiling. 
  
In certain cases where legal requirements apply and form the lawful basis for 
processing, some of the above rights will not apply. For example, when 
processing on the basis of legal obligation, the individual has no right to erasure, 
right to data portability, or right to object. Further information can be found 
at: https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-
general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/individual-rights/ 
 
3 On sharing computerised care records 
 
The five missions of NHSX, the team which is to drive digital transformation for 
health and social care, are: 
• To reduce burden on staff, so they can focus on patients 
• Provide citizens with tools to access information and services directly 
• Clinical information can be safely and digitally accessed 
• Improvement of patient safety across the NHS 
• Increased NHS productivity 
(as expressed at the Digital Healthcare Show, London, June 2019 by the NHSX 
CCIO).  
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Additionally, it has been stated that setting privacy preferences should be part of the 
NHS App, and not be carried out by an application built on top of it.  
See   https://healthtech.blog.gov.uk/2019/05/31/the-nhs-app-a-platform-for-
innovation/   
 
Furthermore, the Local Health and Care Record Exemplar (LHCRE) projects have 
the functionality of preferential sharing of data for direct care, and patients 
contributing information about treatment progress.  
https://healthtech.blog.gov.uk/2019/06/24/nhsx-giving-patients-and-staff-the-
technology-they-need/ 
 
An objective of at least one major Health information Exchange project (HIE) is that 
fine grained authorisation should be required, to the level of a patient telling a GP 
that “this information is only for you”. 
https://www.greatnorthcarerecord.org.uk/information-for-care-
professionals/principles/ 
 
4 Citizens views on sharing data for direct care 
 
A substantial public engagement study has been carried out for the Great North Care 
Record project. The results can be found in  
https://www.greatnorthcarerecord.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/GNCR-public-
engagement-report-FINAL.pdf.  
 
Some findings which are relevant to our Privacy Preferences Tool project were: 
 
• Citizens generally trust the NHS to manage their data, but have less trust in 
commercial organisations or the police. Commercial and for-profit 
organisations are the least trusted. 
• Most people are happy for their data to be shared for their care. However they 
wanted granular control over e.g. restricting sensitive or stigmatising data to 
those who needed to know.  
• Citizens said they would like to have access to data held about them, both to 
see what is said about them and to add additional information like organ 
donor preferences. 
• They expected to be given control over their decisions about information 
sharing and did not think that health care professionals should make 
decisions on behalf of patients or citizens. 
• Across the focus groups citizens struggled to describe what they would like a 
sign-up process and registering their consent to look like due to the lack of a 
visual or interactive model to engage with. 
 
Many other studies and opinion polls have addressed this topic. The PRSB held a 
“Twitter chat” in May 2019: one view expressed by a contributor was that he didn’t 
want care professionals (henceforward abbreviated CPs) who he interacted with to 
know about a particular problem which was not relevant to the treatment or support 
they were providing. 
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5 Supporting the sharing of data 
 
Henceforward we use the term ‘citizen’ to generally include ‘patient’. Taking into 
account citizens’ wishes as expressed in focus groups, and the requirements for 
lawful processing, we propose the following approach for setting sharing controls: 
 
• Permissions controlling access to data generated at a healthcare institution to 
be set by a Care Professional (CP), according to legal requirements for 
processing carried out at that institution (e.g. at a GP surgery). Therefore, the 
CP is ultimately in charge for processing data, taking the citizens’ directives 
into account. 
• The citizen has the right to direct the CP to deny access to selected data for 
the purpose of direct care. However, this is not possible when there is a legal 
requirement for sharing. 
• If the citizen wishes to deny the sharing of data under Common Law which the 
CP deems essential for direct care, the citizen can be offered the following 
option. The CP can make the data available to CPs working at other 
institutions who need to access it (i.e. to teams, roles, or team/role 
combinations), while denying it to others. An indication of the existence of 
concealed sensitive data will be given to all CP users, who would have the 
option of choosing to view sensitive restricted data, if they judged it 
necessary. Messages can be displayed to CP users advising situations when 
the sensitive data should be accessed. 
• When legally required appropriate access will be provided to the 
appropriate authorities. 
 
6 Privacy Preferences Tool 
 
6.1 Procedure for developing preferences and permissions 
 
The overall approach can be summarised as follows: 
 
1. A citizen-user executes queries on their data, and explores the results,  
2. Preferences are defined, 
3. Preferences are verified by executing further queries and observing the 
alterations in the retrieved data, 
4. Preferences can be further reviewed by inspecting simple natural language 
statements of their meaning, 
5. Unwanted preferences can be deleted. 
6. Preferences can be turned into permissions which actually control access to 
data during a consultation with a CP. 
Preferences can be prototyped and developed either during a consultation with a CP 
who receives and enters them, or by citizens themselves if they have been provided 
with an online account.  
Extensive help and guidance buttons and links appear on all screens. 
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Citizen-users are advised that an indication of sensitive data withheld in the first 
instance will be displayed to a CP user, who will be able to access this data if they 
are advised to, or exceptionally if they think they need to. All accesses are recorded 
and audited and can be inspected by the citizen-user. 
Citizens have the option to contribute information about their care, and to set 
preferences on the information they contribute. 
 
6.2 Authorisation functionality 
 
Extensive authorisation functionality is provided by the Privacy Preferences Tool, as  
follows: 
 
1. Preferences can be specified for pre-defined summary concepts such as a health 
condition, situation or circumstance. Our experiments worked with a simple 
master-detail presentation of problems/situations associated with detailed record 
entries. More detailed presentations could have been used, e.g. the MIG 
presentation. https://healthcaregateway.co.uk/services/detailed-care-record/ or a 
subset of the PRSB Core Record https://theprsb.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/04/Persons-core-information-standard-010419-aggregated-
v2.html. However the same preference-setting and searching capabilities are 
achievable with the simpler presentation. 
2. Preferences can be specified for individual record entries, such as issuing a 
prescription, or noting an opinion gained from a telephone consultation. These 
entries are expressed as free-text, and can be linked to one or more summary 
concepts indicated in 6.2.1 above, if appropriate. 
3. Preferences can be expressed and implemented at both general levels of detail 
(e.g. my health data can be shared with any CP who is treating me), and at fine 
grain levels (e.g. my psychosis data can only be shared with my current GP, the 
specialists who created it, and a Psychiatrist I am referred to). 
4. Preferences can be defined for hierarchically structured teams (where a team 
consists of other teams and CP users), and CP roles (also hierarchically 
structured). For example, certain data might be seen by a team leader, but 
denied to other members of the team. 
 
5. Preferences can be defined for team/role combinations. For example, data could 
be generally withheld from team members, but made available to a sub-team (or 
specific individuals in the team) associated with a certain role. 
 
6. Break Glass authorisation functionality is provided to optionally define 
progressively stricter levels of access to sensitive data, with selectively defined 
overrides for teams and roles. 
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6.3 User Roles 
 
1. Citizen. This role includes the patient and social service client roles. 
2. Care Professional. This includes healthcare professional roles such as GPs, 
allied health professionals, doctors, and social service care professionals. 
3. Healthcare Administrator. An administrator role for care-related matters and 
users. 
4. System Administrator. 
 
6.4 Usage Modes for Creating Preferences 
6.4.1 Standard Mode 
This mode provides limited functionality for preference prototyping and is suitable for 
citizens/patients.  
1. It supports specification of constraints on sharing summary data, as defined 
above. A list of the citizen’s main problems (a summary list) is displayed, and 
an item selected.  
2. Then a list of commonly recognised CP roles is displayed, and the opportunity 
afforded to deny access to CPs in one of these roles. Other roles can also be 
explored and selected.  
 
6.4.2 Advanced Mode 
This mode provides additional authorisation functionality over Standard Mode.  It 
could be used by a CP developing and demonstrating preferences and permissions 
to a citizen, or by citizens prototyping preferences themselves. Its functionality 
includes: 
 
• Denying/permitting summary data to selected CP roles. 
• Denying/permitting record-level data to selected CP roles. 
• In particular “Display sensitive data” controls can be defined, to display data 
which the citizen would prefer to be concealed on a first access. Their effects 
can be demonstrated to the patient. 
 
6.4.3 Healthcare Administrator Mode 
For Healthcare Administrator role only. Its functionality includes: 
• Standard and Advanced Mode. 
• Privileged access – creating more powerful preferences giving access to 
sensitive data than can be created using Advanced Mode. 
 
6.5 User Role Functionality 
6.5.1 Citizen 
• Standard and Advanced Mode Preference Development – the user can select 
between these modes. 
• Querying at both ‘normal’ and ‘display sensitive data’ access levels. 
• Contribute information relevant to their care. 
• Review preferences and permissions. 
• Delete unwanted preferences. 
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6.5.2 Care Professional 
• Standard and Advanced Mode Preference Development – self-selected. 
• Query at both ‘normal’ and ‘display sensitive data’ access. 
• Review preferences and permissions. 
• Delete preferences and permissions as directed by patients. 
• Specify messages to be displayed to other care professionals. 
 
6.5.3 Healthcare Administrator 
• Includes Care Professional role functionality. 
• Development of preferences/permissions at Healthcare Administrator Mode. 
• Querying at privileged access level. 
• Creating, managing and overseeing patient and CP accounts 
 
6.5.4 Systems Administrator 
• Includes creating and provisioning Healthcare Administrator accounts, and 
provisioning the Care Professional and Citizen roles. 
 
7 Focus Group Evaluation 
 
7.1 Method 
 
The sessions took place in a Teesside University computing laboratory, where the 
Privacy Preferences Tool was separately installed on the laboratory computers. The 
focus group sessions started with a group introduction to the tool followed by a 
demonstration using fictitious data based on a real scenario. Participants were then 
given an opportunity to familiarise themselves with the tool on a lab computer and 
execute a query using the scenario. Subsequently a group discussion was then 
followed by another session using the tool, to set preferences unaided for a different 
scenario. This was followed by a final group discussion. Participants were discreetly 
observed and supported individually at times while testing the tool.  
 
7.2 Summary of results. 
 
1. The ability to specify individuals for open access and restrict it to others was 
appreciated. Participants thought that it would be useful to specify which data 
was restricted too.  
2. There was concern that the public would not understand the tool’s purpose, the 
social data that was covered and the individual roles of practitioners. In particular, 
they anticipated that certain groups, possibly those who are especially vulnerable 
such as the elderly and those with learning difficulties, would struggle to 
understand the purpose of the tool and how to use it. 
3. Users with high levels of computing skills and experience (students and 
University staff) said that they found the tool straightforward, but all other groups 
found it moderate or hard to use in the time available. All participants managed to 
set preferences and restrict access with support. Less experienced and usually 
middle-aged or elderly participants said that if they were on their own computer, 
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were given plenty of time to familiarise themselves, could practice and write down 
the various steps required, then they would be able to use the tool independently.  
4. All participants made suggestions to alter the terminology to increase usability. 
Many terms were said to be in ‘computer-speak’, used differently in common 
parlance and/or not words in current usage. Suggested amendments to terms 
were gradually being introduced during the data collection process to improve 
clarity. 
5. Participants questioned if the level of knowledge among the general population, 
about medical conditions and health and social care systems, which was 
assumed by the tool, was realistic.  
6. Support, it was suggested, could come in various guises, including increasing 
user-friendliness through design, online sources and personal mechanisms. For 
example: a video tutorial, improved navigational prompts, a Frequently Asked 
Questions sheet and/or step-by-step instructions. Specific groups, without the 
relevant computer skills, would definitely require personal support. 
7. Data-sharing with care professionals was not a focus of the questions asked of 
participants; however, they expressed many opinions about it. There was broad 
agreement that it should be made available to medical staff but much more 
restricted for social care staff.  
8. The idea that specific professionals could be given access was welcomed by 
some participants. Although it was recognised that there was a danger that 
patients/clients might not fully realise the impact of any restrictions to access.  
9. That there was a choice other than everyone or no-one sees their data was well 
received. The potential this offered for their medical and/or social carers to work 
more closely together was viewed positively, citing opportunities to reduce silo-
thinking and medical mistakes.  
10. It was pointed out by participants that social care professionals require medical 
information also, to care well for their client e.g. about any long-term health 
conditions. Participants thought that, with the increasing use of care services for 
the elderly, this was likely to become a focus of the tool. 
11. Boundaries to data access, where they should be drawn and by whom, was a 
major topic of discussion in Focus Groups 2 & 4. It was argued that the 
appropriate decision-maker was dependent on the situation. The list of decision-
makers included: 
• Patient/client only 
• General Practitioner 
• Acute medical or surgical doctor 
• Allied Health Professional 
• Social care team lead 
• Care home manager 
• Carer. 
12. Doctors were seen as experts, who might require wide access on which to base 
their medical/surgical decisions. It was suggested in one group that surgeons 
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should automatically have unrestricted access. While social care professionals 
were not spoken of as experts and the information they might require was 
expressed in vague terms and, it was suggested, should be decided on a case-
by-case basis. 
13. Confidentiality was seen by participants as a thorny issue when support was 
required to a) use the tool and b) to make personal data-sharing decisions. In 
their view, patients/clients could be open to having their opinions overruled, 
unless a system was provided to protect them. To limit this possibility as far as 
possible, participants suggested that patients/clients would benefit from the 
process being simplified. 
14. The override for health and social care professionals, offered by the tool, spurred 
much debate among participants. They were acutely aware of the dangers of 
restricting data, especially to medical workers, although they liked the concept of 
choice; however, they were uncomfortable with the idea that their choice could be 
overridden. They favoured the view that the decision must be made in 
consultation with care professionals but accepted this was not always feasible 
e.g. if a patient was not in a condition to give informed consent, such as following 
an accident. Hence the need for an emergency button or override. 
15. Most group members were in favour of a mobile version of the tool and thought it 
would appeal to the public, especially the young. However, some older people 
said they would be unlikely to use a mobile for this type of work. The feasibility of 
adapting it in an acceptable way was questioned, although there was support for 
an app if it could be done. 
To summarise: 
16. The tool was acceptable as a useful asset for accessing patient/client records. 
The requirement for a thorough, initial explanation of the purpose of the tool and 
how to use it was crucial to successful user engagement. 
17. A high standard (degree level) of computer literacy was needed to confidently 
use and navigate this tool. Members of the public, with individual, personal 
support were able to execute queries and set preferences. The main barriers to 
usability related to terminology, presentation and navigation.  
18. Participants were attracted to the idea behind the tool, to share data more 
effectively and usefully, through systems that complied with ethical governance 
processes to protect patients and clients. However, there were reservations 
about the robustness and feasibility of systems in restricting access. 
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8 Conclusions – the use of a Privacy Preferences Tool 
 
The focus group studies did not directly address some wider issues of data sharing: 
 
• Authentication of citizen/patient users. How can it be guaranteed that a user 
restricting the availability of medical data, which might be crucial to their own 
treatment and safety, and maybe that of others, is who they say they are. 
There is always the possibility of coercion by other family members or 
acquaintances. 
• Deliberate misuse. Where a user might restrict data for purposes other than 
the benefit of their care and well-being. An example might be a patient 
addicted to prescription drugs visiting several healthcare providers to obtain 
them. 
 
For these and the other reasons outlined above, we suggest it is not appropriate to 
allow citizens to set permissions which control access to their health and social care 
data independently. However, a Privacy Preferences Tool could be used for citizens 
to explore their own data and develop preferences which could subsequently be 
turned into permissions in a professional care environment, following advice from 
care professionals. Citizens would still be in control over who could access their data 
(in so far as they are legally allowed), but the problems of potential lack of 
understanding, inadequate computer skills, authentication, and deliberate misuse 
could be minimised or eliminated altogether. 
